Political Institutions and Public Policy:The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union and the Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy
AbstractIn this paper we study the implications of the introduction of the co-decision procedure for the European UnionÃ¢â¬â¢s Common Agricultural Policy and its reform. We use a game-theoretical model of the legislative procedures in the European Union and show that the move from consultation to co-decision implies a shift of power from the Commission to the European Parliament. The implications for the Common Agricultural Policy depend on the configuration of preferences, the location of the status quo, and the bargaining powers in the Conciliation Committee. If the member states and the European Parliament are more opposed to reform than is the Commission, the introduction of co-decision reduces the prospects for reform of the European UnionÃ¢â¬â¢s Common Agricultural Policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in its series Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven with number urn:hdl:123456789/319569.
Date of creation: 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- Christophe Crombez & Johan F.M. Swinnen, 2011. "Political Institutions and Public Policy: The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union and the Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy," LICOS Discussion Papers 28611, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
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- Abdul G. Noury & Gérard Roland, 2002.
"More power to the European Parliament?,"
CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 279-319, October.
- Pokrivcak, Jan & Crombez, Christophe & Swinnen, Jo, 2006.
"The status quo bias and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy: impact of voting rules, the European Commission and external changes,"
Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
urn:hdl:123456789/101047, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Jan Pokrivcak & Christophe Crombez & Johan F. M. Swinnen, 2006. "The status quo bias and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy: impact of voting rules, the European Commission and external changes," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 33(4), pages 562-590, December.
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