The European road pricing game: how to enforce optimal pricing in high-transit countries under asymmetric information
AbstractA federal government tries to force local governments to implement welfare optimal tolling and investment. Welfare optimal tolling requires charging for marginal external costs. Local governments have an incentive to charge more than the marginal social cost whenever there is transit traffic. We analyse the pricing and investment issue in an asymmetric information setting where the local governments have better information than the federal government. The case of air pollution and of congestion are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in its series Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven with number urn:hdl:123456789/315566.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- Saskia VAN DER LOO & Stef PROOST, 2011. "The European road pricing game: how to enforce optimal pricing in high-transit countries under asymmetric information," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces11.19, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
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- De Borger, Bruno & Proost, Stef, 2012. "Policies to reduce traffic externalities in cities," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/352751, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
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