The cost effectiveness of environmental policy instruments in the presence of imperfect compliance
Abstract
We aim to integrate information, monitoring and enforcement costs into the choice of environmental policy instruments. We use a static partial equilibrium framework to study different combinations of regulatory instruments (taxes, standards…) and enforcement instruments (criminal fine, administrative fine…). The firms’ compliance decisions depend on the instrument combination selected by the government. The model is used to compare the welfare effects of different instrument combinations for the textile industry in Flanders. We find that administrative, implementation, enforcement and monitoring costs are important to decide on the necessity of an environmental policy. Moreover, we show that emission taxes are not necessarily the most cost-effective instrument. This result holds even if we include industry heterogeneity. The decision of whether to pursue an environmental policy or not depends crucially on the formulation of an appropriate monitoring and enforcement policyDownload Info
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Paper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in its series Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven with number urn:hdl:123456789/238237.Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/238237
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Web page: http://www.kuleuven.be
Related research
Keywords: K32 Environmental Law; K42 Illegal behaviour and enforcement of law; Q28 Government policy;Other versions of this item:
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2002. "The Cost Effectiveness of Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0204, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Rousseau, Sandra & Proost, Stef, 2002. "The cost effectiveness of environmental policy instruments in the presence of imperfect compliance," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/119427, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2002. "The Cost Effectiveness of Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0204, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- Env - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - - - -
- Law - Industrial Organization - - - - -
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Malik, Arun S, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Choice of Policy Instruments for Controlling Pollution," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(4), pages 714-21, October.
- Stef Proost & Kurt Van Dender & C. Courcelle & B. De Borger & J. Peirson & D. Sharp & R. Vickerman & E. Gibbons & M. O'Mahony & Q. Heaney & J. Van den Bergh & E. Verhoef, 2001.
"How large is the gap between present and efficient transport prices in Europe?,"
Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series
ete0120, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Proost, S. & Van Dender, K. & Courcelle, C. & De Borger, B. & Peirson, J. & Sharp, D. & Vickerman, R. & Gibbons, E. & O'Mahony, M. & Heaney, Q. & Van den Bergh, J. & Verhoef, E., 2002. "How large is the gap between present and efficient transport prices in Europe?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 41-57, January.
- Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
- Harford, Jon D., 1978. "Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 26-43, March.
- Oates, Wallace E & Portney, Paul R & McGartland, Albert M, 1989. "The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based Regulation: A Case Study of Environmental Standard Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1233-42, December.
- Rousseau, Sandra & Proost, Stef, 2001.
"The relative efficiency of environmental policy instruments in a second-best setting with costly monitoring and enforcements,"
Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
urn:hdl:123456789/238236, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Rousseau, Sandra & Proost, Stef, 2001. "The relative efficiency of environmental policy instruments in a second-best setting with costly monitoring and enforcement," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/119752, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2001. "The Relative Efficiency of Environmental Policy Instruments in a Second-Best Setting with Costly Monitoring and Enforcements," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0104, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2001. "The relative efficiency of environmental policy instruments in a second-best setting with costly monitoring and enforcement," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0101, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Rousseau, Sandra, 2003.
"Using emission standards under incomplete compliance,"
Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
urn:hdl:123456789/174856, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Sandra Rousseau & Carole M. Billiet, 2003. "Using emission standards under incomplete compliance," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0303, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
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