The relative efficiency of market-based environmental policy instruments with imperfect compliance
Abstract
We study how the relative cost efficiency of three market-based instruments—emission taxes, tradable permits and output taxes—is influenced by the combination of accounting for incomplete compliance and pre-existing labor taxes. First,accounting for violations makes the policy instruments less effective so that environmental damages have to be larger to justify a policy. Secondly, including fines in a second-best setting provides a new means of collecting government revenues and of lessening existing tax distortions.We show that the relative position of grandfathered tradable permits vis-à-vis emission taxes improves considerably when incomplete compliance is incorporated in a second-best setting. A simple AGE model illustrates the results.Download Info
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Paper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in its series Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven with number urn:hdl:123456789/211396.Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International tax and public finance (2009-02) v.16, p.25-42
Handle: RePEc:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/211396
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Web page: http://www.kuleuven.be
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2009. "The relative efficiency of market-based environmental policy instruments with imperfect compliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 25-42, February.
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2004. "The Relative Efficiency of Market-based Environmental Policy Instruments with Imperfect Compliance," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0415, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Rousseau, Sandra & Proost, Stef, 2004. "The relative efficiency of market-based environmental policy instruments with imperfect compliance," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/120205, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Inge Mayeres & Stef Proost, 1998.
"Marginal Tax Reform, Externalities and Income Distribution,"
Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers
ces9832, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- Mayeres, Inge & Proost, Stef, 2001. "Marginal tax reform, externalities and income distribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 343-363, February.
- Mayeres, Inge & Proost, Stef, 1998. "Marginal tax reform, externalities and income distribution," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/238244, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2002. "Prices versus quantities with incomplete enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 435-454, September.
- Harford, Jon D., 1978. "Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 26-43, March.
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2005. "Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 32(3), pages 337-365, November.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2005. "Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 32(3), pages 337-365, November.
- Blondiau, Thomas & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "The impact of the judicial objective function on the enforcement of environmental standards," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/252662, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
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