Using emission standards under incomplete compliance
Abstract
Using the case study of water pollution in the Flemish textile industry, we discuss three empirical questions concerning the use of emission standards. Firstly, given a particular emission standard and the willingness to pay (WTP) for an environmental improvement, which monitoring and enforcement policy provides us with the highest welfare? Secondly, given the WTP, which combination of an emission standard and a monitoring and enforcement strategy gives the highest welfare level? Thirdly, if one wants to attain a certain level of emissions, which combination of an emission standard and a monitoring and enforcement strategy maximises welfare?Download Info
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Paper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in its series Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven with number urn:hdl:123456789/174856.Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/174856
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Web page: http://www.kuleuven.be
Related research
Keywords: Experience; Economics; Policy; Reserves; Impact; Firms; Decisions; Decision;Other versions of this item:
- Sandra Rousseau & Carole M. Billiet, 2003. "Using emission standards under incomplete compliance," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0303, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rousseau, Sandra & Proost, Stef, 2002.
"The cost effectiveness of environmental policy instruments in the presence of imperfect compliance,"
Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
urn:hdl:123456789/119427, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2002. "The Cost Effectiveness of Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0204, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2002. "The Cost Effectiveness of Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0204, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- Rousseau, Sandra & Proost, Stef, 2002. "The cost effectiveness of environmental policy instruments in the presence of imperfect compliance," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/238237, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- R. Damania, 1999. "Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(4), pages 415-433, June.
- Clifford S. Russell & Philip T. Powell, 1996. "Choosing Environmental Policy Tools: Theoretical Cautions and Practical Considerations," IDB Publications 25258, Inter-American Development Bank.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2005. "Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 32(3), pages 337-365, November.
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