Asymmetric spillovers and sequential strategic investments
AbstractThe focus of this paper is on the consequences of asymmetric spillovers on the strategic investments in an oligopoly with leaders and followers. Both in the investment and output game, leaders move before the followers. Spillovers may occur between leaders and between followers and from leaders to followers. The consequences are detailed for:- the comparison of leader and follower efforts;- the comparison of investments with or without cooperation of leaders, followers or leaders and followers;- other specific real world situations.It will be argued that there are critical levels of spillovers that drive the relevant tendencies. They tend to depend in a complex way on the other parameters of the oligopoly. Still some clear tendencies emerge that can help to understand asymmetric leader-follower rivalry.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in its series Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven with number urn:hdl:123456789/120526.
Date of creation: 2007
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Asymmetric spillovers; Cooperation; Sequential game; Strategic investments;
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