Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values

Contents:

Author Info

  • Orzach, Ram
  • Forges, Françoise

Abstract

In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy et al. [Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., Sela, A., 2002. Dominance solvability of second-pricesauctions with differential information. Journal of Mathematical Economics 37, 247–258], describe a cooperative games in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism. An example shows that, if the bidders’ information partitions are not connected, rings may no longer be core-stable.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://basepub.dauphine.fr/xmlui/bitstream/123456789/7891/2/corerings.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université Paris-Dauphine in its series Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine with number urn:hdl:123456789/7891.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2011) v.47, p.760-767
Handle: RePEc:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/7891

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dauphine.fr/en/welcome.html

Related research

Keywords: Characteristic function; Partition form game; Core; Collusion; Bayesian game; Auctions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847.
  2. Ray, Debraj, 2007. "A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199207954, September.
  3. Donsimoni, Marie-Paule & Economides, Nicholas S & Polemarchakis, Herakles M, 1986. "Stable Cartels," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 317-27, June.
  4. Forges, Françoise & Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/4100, Université Paris-Dauphine.
  5. Riham Barbar & Françoise Forges, 2007. "Collusion dans les enchères. Quelques apports des jeux coopératifs," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(5), pages 965-984.
  6. Giuseppe Lopomo & Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. Marx, 2005. "Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 0(1), pages 4.
  7. F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1999. "A note on the incentive compatible core," THEMA Working Papers 99-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  8. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Economics Papers 2004-W09, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/7891

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendin-Malegdé Patrick Kaboré).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.