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Efficacité des structures de contrôle et enracinement des dirigeants

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  • Alexandre, Hervé
  • Paquerot, Mathieu

Abstract

Dans le cadre théorique du gouvernement d'entreprise, cet article étudie l'efficacité du contrôle exercé par la structure de propriété et le conseil d'administration sur les dirigeants. La confrontation des théories de l'enracinement et de l'agence permet de déterminer les conditions nécessaires à l'efficacité des contrôleurs. La structure de propriété et le conseil d'administration réunissent rarement l'ensemble des conditions. Les tests réalisés avec la méthode du bootstrap corroborent les hypothèses de la théorie de l'enracinement et rejettent en partie les arguments de la théorie de l'agence.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université Paris-Dauphine in its series Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine with number urn:hdl:123456789/6186.

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Date of creation: Jun 2000
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Publication status: Published in Finance contrôle stratégie (2000-06) v.3, p.5-29
Handle: RePEc:ner:dauphi:urn:hdl:123456789/6186

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Keywords: gouvernement d'entreprise; théorie de l’agence; théorie de l'enracinement; structure de propriété; conseil d'administration.; corporate governance; agency theory; entrenchment theory; ownership structure; board of directors;

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  1. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. " Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 31-48, March.
  2. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, . "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CRSP working papers 335, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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  7. Gérard Charreaux, 1997. "L'entreprise publique est-elle nécessairement moins efficace?," Working Papers FARGO 0970901, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
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  10. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," NBER Working Papers 6625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Gérard Charreaux, 1991. "Structure de propriété, relation d'agence et performance financière," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 521-552.
  12. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
  13. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
  14. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
  15. Castanias, Richard P. & Helfat, Constance E., 1992. "Managerial and windfall rents in the market for corporate control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 153-184, July.
  16. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
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Cited by:
  1. Rim Zouari-Hadiji & Ghazi Zouari, 2010. "Gouvernance interne et investissement en R&D : une comparaison internationale," Working Papers FARGO 1100102, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
  2. Mehdi Nekhili & Ines Fakhfakh, 2006. "Les Relations Entre Les Mecanismes De Gouvernement Et L'Indice De Divulgation Volontaire D'Informations : Etude Clinique De Deux Entreprises Tunisiennes," Post-Print halshs-00558233, HAL.
  3. Mehdi Nekhili & Afifa Wali Siala & Dhikra Chebbi-Nehkili, 2009. "Free Cash Flow, gouvernance et politique financière des entreprises françaises," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(1), pages 5-31, March.
  4. Wiem Elmanaa Madani & Wafa Khlif, 2005. "Effets De La Structure De Propriete Sur La Performance Comptable : Etude Empirique Sur Les Entreprises Tunisiennes Indistruelles Non Cotees," Post-Print halshs-00581192, HAL.
  5. Djaoudath Alidou, 2011. "Les augmentations de capital réservées aux salariés en France - Employee Equity Issue:Evidence from France," Working Papers FARGO 1110603, Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance).
  6. Bouaziz, Zied & Triki, Mohamed, 2012. "L’impact du conseil d’administration sur la performance financière des entreprises Tunisiennes
    [The impact of the Board of directors on the financial performance of Tunisian companies]    ," MPRA Paper 38672, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Fatma Tifafi & Dominique Dufour, 2006. "Une analyse de la présence d'administrateurs indépendants au sein du conseil d'administration : contrôle ou conseil ?," Post-Print halshs-00558255, HAL.
  8. Makram Chemangui, 2005. "La Problématique De Mesure De La Qualité D'Audit : Proposition D'Une Approche De Conception," Post-Print halshs-00581155, HAL.
  9. Karima Bouaiss & Christine Marsal, 2009. "Les mécanismes internes de gouvernance dans les banques:un état de l'art," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(1), pages 93-126, March.
  10. Pascal Dumontier & Sonda Chtourou & Soumaya Ayedi, 2006. "La qualité de l'audit externe et les mécanismes de gouvernance des entreprises : Une étude empirique menée dans le contexte tunisien," Post-Print halshs-00548115, HAL.

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