Was the Argentine “corralito” an efficient measure?: a note
AbstractTheoretical banking literature has largely explored the role of financial intermediaries in the economy, market failures (banking panics) in the banking sector and the need for bank regulation. However, most models of banking panics and regulation have not been empirically tested. The Argentine 2001 crisis, with a large deposit withdrawal and the regulation introduced (suspension of convertibility) constitutes a scenario in order to apply some of the theoretical predictions. In particular, the paper applies Samartín [Samartín, M. (2002). Suspension of convertibility vesus deposit insurance: A welfare comparison. European Finance Review, 6(2), 223–244] to the particular case of Argentina. After the estimation of the most important parameters, the model predicts that suspension of convertibility seems to have been the most efficient intervention measure to stop the massive deposit withdrawals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/7175.
Length: 455 p.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Review of Economics & Finance (2007) v.v. 16, p.444-453
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Argentina; Banking panics; Deposit insurance; Suspension of convertibility;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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