Selling information in extensive form games
AbstractWe consider a situation in wich decision markets in an extensive form game can by aditional information from an information seller before reaching their decisions. Prices for information are selected by the seller. We analyze a variety of scenarios for the price sitting process by the seller: the case in which prices are chosen before the game stars (ex-ante pricing), the case in which prices are chosen during the game (ex-post pricing) and the situation in which the seller can pit buyers against each other in determining what information is to be sold. Within the context of ex-ante pricin, we also consider the situaction in which the pricise information offered to the decision makers is not exogenously given but is selected by the seller.
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Extensive form games; Information;
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