Credible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall
AbstractCredible equilibria were defined in Ferreira, Gilboa and Maschler (1995) to handle situations of preferences changing along time in a model given by an extensive form game. This paper extends the definition to the case of infinite games and, more important, to games with nonperfect recall. These games are of great interest in possible applications of the model, but the original definition was not applicable to them. The difficulties of this extension are solved by using some ideas in the literatue of abstract systems and by proposing new ones that may prove useful in more general settings.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/6025.
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.uc3m.es
Bad sets; credible equilibrium; good sets; infinite games; imperfect recall; semistable partitions; stable sets; ugly sets;
Other versions of this item:
- Corcho, Paula & Ferreira, José Luis, 1998. "Credible equilibria in non-finite games and in games without perfect recall," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/5134, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 159-73, February.
- Ferreira J. -L. & Gilboa I. & Maschler M., 1995.
"Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 284-317, August.
- Ferreira, J.L. & Gilboa, I. & Maschler, M., 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Papers 9217, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Ferreira, J. & Gilboa, I. & Maschler, M., 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Discussion Paper 1992-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- J.L. Ferreira, 1992. "Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play," Discussion Papers 988, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Chakravorti, B. & Kahn, C.M., 1993. "Universal Coalition-Proof Equilibrium: Concepts and Applications," Papers 98, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.
- Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1992. "The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 101-121, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Contact person).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.