Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets
AbstractIn the context of coalition formation games a player evaluates a partition on the basis f the set she belongs to. For this evaluation to be possible, player are supposed to have preferences over sets to which they could belong. In this paper, we suggest two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets. For the first one, derived from the most preferred member of a set, it is shown that a strict core partition always exists if the original preferences are strict and a simple algorithm for the computation of one strict core partitiion is derived. This algorithm turns out to be strategy proof. The second extension, based on the least preferred member of a set, produces solutions very similar to those for the stable roommates problem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/5605.
Length: 496 p.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory (2001) v. 29, p.487-494
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Web page: http://www.uc3m.es
Coalition formation games; Core; Stable rommates problem; Digraphs; Algorithms;
Other versions of this item:
- Cechlárová, Katarína & Romero-Medina, Antonio, . "Stability in one-sided matching markets," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4158, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
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Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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