Endogenous protection of R and D investments
AbstractWe examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R and D investments from spilling over to competitors. Contrary to most of the existing literature, we show that the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R and D investments. We also show that even if protection is costless, firms sometimes choose to let their R and D investments unprotected. Our welfare analysis indicates that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge should be adopted.
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- María José Gil Moltó & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Vicente Orts, 2005.
"Cooperative R&D with Endogenous Technology Differentiation,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 461-476, 06.
- María José Gil Moltó & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Vicente Orts, 2004. "Cooperative R&D with Endogenous Technology Differentiation," Industrial Organization 0401009, EconWPA.
- Chrysovalantou Milliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2012. "Vertical integration, knowledge disclosure and decreasing rival's cost," Economics Working Papers we1213, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Noriaki Matsushima & Koki Arai & Ikuo Ishibashi & Fumio Sensui, 2011. "The effects of non-assertion of patents provisions: R&D incentives in vertical relationships," ISER Discussion Paper 0807, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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