Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic
AbstractA fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a␣given budget to financing the provision of public goods (education, transportation, police, etc.). In this paper it is established that when␣admissible preferences are those representable by continuous and increasing utility functions, then strategy-proof allocation mechanisms whose (undominated) range contains three or more outcomes are dictatorial on the set of profiles of strictly increasing utility functions, a dense subset of the domain in the topologies commonly used in this context. If admissible utility functions are further restricted to be strictly increasing, or if mechanisms are required to be non-wasteful, then strategy-profness leads to (full) dictatorship.
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- Diego Moreno, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 183-197.
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
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- Diego Moreno & María José Moscoso, 2001.
"A Gibbad-Satterthwaite Theorem for Public Good Economies,"
Economics Working Papers
we014912, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Moreno, Diego & Moscoso, María José, . "A gibbad-satterthwaite theorem for public good economies," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/256, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Salvador Barberà, 2010.
"Strategy-proof social choice,"
420, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Peters, Hans & Sen, Arunava, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 392-416, October.
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