Income taxation, uncertainty and stability
AbstractThis paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner. It is well known that in a model without uncertainty the existence of such a policy is very rare. We show, however, that in real cases this might not be a serious problem since small amounts of uncertainty can bring stability to the status quo. It is also shown that linear tax functions can only be stable in economies with very egalitarian income distributions and high taxation levels
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/4173.
Length: 302 p.
Date of creation: Feb 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Public Economics (1998-02) v.v. 67, p.285-300
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.uc3m.es
Majority voting; Income taxation; Uncertainty; Status quo;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2010.
"Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods,"
10.02, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., 2010. "Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods," CORE Discussion Papers 2010080, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2010. "Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods," Working Papers 2010-01, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, 2007.
"A Positive Theory of Income Taxation,"
Departmental Working Papers
200706, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Efe Ok, 2004. "Multidimensional income taxation and electoral competition: an equilibrium analysis," Departmental Working Papers 200407, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol & Klor, Esteban F., 2003.
"Representative democracy and marginal rate progressive income taxation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2339-2366, September.
- Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol & Klor, Esteban F., 2003. "Representative democracy and marginal rate progressive income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1137-1164, May.
- Carbonell, O. & Klor, E., 2000. "Representative Democracy and Marginal Rate Progressive Income Taxation," Working Papers 00-12, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol & Ok, Efe A., 2007. "Voting over income taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 249-286, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Contact person).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.