Asymetric price-benefit auctions
AbstractThis paper studies the performance of three different auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when the partners have valuations for the assets that are independent but asymmetrically distributed, wirh one partner reputed to be more interested in the assets to be divided. 1 provide results on existence, and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by these auctions. 1 also show sorne propertiers of these equilibria, in particular tilat witil positive probability tile ex post outcome is inefficient. The results contrast wiril tilose for tile case of symmetric distributions.
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Efficient dissolution; Auction; Asymmetry; Bayesian Equilibrium;
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- Frutos, María Ángeles de, . "Asymmetric Price-Benefit Auctions," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4413, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
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