On the stability of best reply and gradient systems with application to imperfectly competitive models
AbstractWe present a general result on the convergence to an equilibrium of class of dynamic adjustment procedures which includes gradient systems and best reply dynamics as special cases - when there are two players and strategy sets are one dimensional. We also show that there are no restrictions on the form of the gradient or best reply dynamics, even under strong restrictions on the functional form of both demand and costs. This implies that we can construct examples with three players where the above dynamical procedures yield chaotic behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/3812.
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Gradient; Best reply; Chaos; Stability;
Other versions of this item:
- Corchon, Luis C. & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "On the stability of best reply and gradient systems with applications to imperfectly competitive models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 59-65, April.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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