Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production
AbstractSuppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumption good from an input. A sharing rule associates input contributions with a vector of consumption. We consider sharing rules that are a convex combination of the Proportional, the Equal Share and the Equal Benefit Rules. We characterize the subset of sharing rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and individual rationality.We also study the outcome of majority voting on this subselection of sharing rules.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/3811.
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Sharing rule; Individual rationality; Voting;
Other versions of this item:
- Corchon, Luis C. & Puy, M. Socorro, 1998. "Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 83-90, April.
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
- P13 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Cooperative Enterprises
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