Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Two-sided career concern and financial equilibrium

Contents:

Author Info

  • Portilla, Yolanda
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    This brief paper constructs a model of delegated portfolio management in which two agency relationships are characterized. First, a delegation process from investors to fund companies, and second, a delegation from fund companies to fund managers. Career concerns of both agents lead to a churning equilibrium in which uninformed managers trade noisily, and uninformed fund companies are willing to hire these uninformed managers. This equilibrium delivers non-fully informative prices and a positive and high trading volume. Our model then strengths previous explanations to the trade puzzle, predicting an increasing trade activity as long as institutional investors with intense delegation play an increasing role in financial markets.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/10016/3775/5/we091207.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/3775.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation:
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ner:carlos:info:hdl:10016/3775

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.uc3m.es

    Related research

    Keywords: Career concern; Financial equilibrium; Trade puzzle;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ner:carlos:info:hdl:10016/3775

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Contact person).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.