A Decent Proposal
AbstractIn this paper we explore the notion that players are decent, in the sense that their choices are bound by certain unwritten social rules. We apply this idea to two cases: bankruptcy and bargaining in exchange economies. We characterize the result that are generated by such a behavior in the cases of bankruptcy and in two person bargaining in exchange economies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/3634.
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- Luis Corchón & Carmen Herrero Blanco, 1995. "A Decent Proposal," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Corchón, Luis C. & Herrero, C., . "A decent proposal," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3862, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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