Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production
AbstractIn this paper we consider a model of cooperative production in which rational agents have the possibility to engage in sabotage activities that decrease output. It is shown that sabotage depends on the interplay between the degree of congestion, the technology of sabotage, the number of agents the degree of meritocracy and the form of the sharing rule. In particular it is shown that, ceteries paribus, meritorcratic systems give more incentives to sabotage than egalitarian systems. We address two questions: The degree of meritocracy that is compatible with absence of sabotage and the existence of a Nash equilibrium with and without sabotage.
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Other versions of this item:
- Luis C. Corchón & Carmen Beviá, 2002. "Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production," Economics Working Papers we20021001, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Carmen Bevia & Luis Corchon, . "Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 541.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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