Strategy-proof mechanisms with monotonic preferences: The case of pure public goods economies
AbstractThis paper explores a typical public finance problem where there are m public goods (education, transportation, police, etc.) provided in limited amounts due to budget constraints, and where individual's preferences are not known. It is shown that all institutions (i.e., decision mechanisms) available to decide the allocation of goods have very unattractive properties: either the decision mechanisms are not compatible with individual's incentives, or they are dictatorial (i.e, they are based on a single individual's preferences).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/2919.
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- Moreno, Diego, . "Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4218, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson, 1991. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods," Discussion Papers 964, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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