Managing a duopolistic water market with confirmed proposals : an experiment. Gestión de un duopolio acuífero con propuestas confirmadas : un experimento
AbstractWe report results from experimental water markets in which owners of two different sources of water supply water to households and farmers. The final water quality consumed by each type of consumer is determined through mixing of qualities from two different resources. We compare the standard duopolistic market structure with an alternative market clearing mechanism inspired by games with confirmed strategies (which have been shown to yield collusive outcomes). As in the static case, complex dynamic markets operating under a confirmed proposals protocol yield less efficient outcomes because coordination among independent suppliers has the usual effects of restricting output and increasing prices to the users. Our results suggest that, when market mechanisms are used to allocate water to its users, the rule of thumb used by competition authorities can also serve as a guide towards water market regulation.------------------------------------------------------------------------
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/14981.
Length: 215 p.
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Revista internacional de sociología (2012-03) v.v. 70, p.189-213
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.uc3m.es
Allocation of water; Dynamic duopoly; Endogenous water quality; Games with confirmed proposals; Calidad endógena del agua; Duopolio dinámico; Juegos con propuestas confirmadas;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2012-08-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-IND-2012-08-23 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Aurora GarcÃa Gallego & Nikolaos GeorgantzÃs & Aldo Montesano, 2010.
"Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals,"
LERNA Working Papers
10.02.308, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Attanasi, Giuseppe & Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Montesano, Aldo, 2010. "Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals," TSE Working Papers 10-192, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Gardner, Roy & Moore, Michael R & Walker, James M, 1997. "Governing a Groundwater Commons: A Strategic and Laboratory Analysis of Western Water Law," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 218-34, April.
- Walker, James M. & Gardner, Roy & Ostrom, Elinor, 1990. "Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 203-211, November.
- Ziv Bar-Shira & Israel Finkelshtain & Avi Simhon, 2006. "Block-Rate versus Uniform Water Pricing in Agriculture: An Empirical Analysis," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(4), pages 986-999.
- Walker, James M & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(414), pages 1149-61, September.
- James Murphy & Ariel Dinar & Richard Howitt & Steven Rassenti & Vernon Smith, 2000. "The Design of ``Smart'' Water Market Institutions Using Laboratory Experiments," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(4), pages 375-394, December.
- Georgantzís, Nikolaos & García-Gallego, Aurora & Fatás-Jubería, Enrique & Kujal, Praveen & Neugebauer, Tibor, 2004. "Mixture and distribution of different water qualities: an experiment on vertical structure in a complex market," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/5411, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Varela-Ortega, Consuelo & M. Sumpsi, Jose & Garrido, Alberto & Blanco, Maria & Iglesias, Eva, 1998. "Water pricing policies, public decision making and farmers' response: implications for water policy," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 19(1-2), pages 193-202, September.
- Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 1997. "Mitigating the Tragedy of the Commons through Cooperation: An Experimental Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 148-172, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Contact person).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.