Government, taxes and banking crises
AbstractThis paper analyzes the effectiveness of different government policies to prevent the emergence of bank ing crises. In particular, we study the impact on welfare of using taxpayers money to recapitalize banks, government injection of money into the banking system through credit lines, the creation of a buffer and taxes on financial transactions (the Tobin tax). We illustrate the trade off between these policies and derive policy implications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III de Madrid in its series Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid with number info:hdl:10016/12766.
Length: 2772 p.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of banking & finance (2011) v. 35, p.2761-2770
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Web page: http://www.uc3m.es
Banking crises; Information induced bank runs; Government policies; Taxes;
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ACC-2012-01-03 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-01-03 (Banking)
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