Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
AbstractWe show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial -- i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial -- i.e., they select the dictator's preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. Thus, our results reveal the extent to which the conflict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems.
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Allocation mechanisms; Public goods; Strategy-proofness; Dictatorship; Efficiency;
Other versions of this item:
- Diego Moreno & María José Moscoso, 2010. "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods," Economics Working Papers we1027, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Moreno, Diego, . "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/2917, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
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- Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995.
Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
- Hurwicz, Leonid & Walker, Mark, 1990. "On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 683-704, May.
- Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Moreno, Diego, . "Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4218, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Moreno, Diego & Walker, Mark, . "Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4217, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
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