Antitrust Merger Policy: Lessons from the Australian Experience
AbstractA study of the operation of Australia's merger policy over the last twenty-seven years can yield lessons for countries that are contemplating the introduction of their own merger policy. If it is to be used to enhance value, merger policy should provide that any possible increase in monopoly power be weighed against any increases in efficiency. The process by which this is achieved should be undertaken with speed and secrecy so as not to deter efficiency-enhancing mergers. The twin requirements of speed and secrecy will, in turn, present problems in achieving fair process and the creation of precedent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9600.
Date of creation: Apr 2003
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Publication status: published as Ito, Takatoshi and Anne O. Krueger (eds.) Governance, regulation, and privatization in the Asia-Pacific region NBER-East Asia Seminar on Economics, vol. 12. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2004.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-04-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2003-04-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2003-04-09 (Industrial Organization)
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