A Case for Quantity Regulation
AbstractContrary to the standard economic advice, many regulations of financial intermediaries, as well as other regulations such as blue laws, fishing rules, zoning restrictions, or pollution controls, take the form of quantity controls rather than taxes. We argue that costs of enforcement are crucial to understanding these choices. When violations of quantity regulations are cheaper to discover than failures to pay taxes, the former can emerge as the optimal instrument for the government, even when it is less attractive in the absence of enforcement costs. This analysis is especially relevant to situations where private enforcement of regulations is crucial.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 8184.
Date of creation: Mar 2001
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Note: CF LE PE
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Other versions of this item:
- Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "A Case for Quantity Regulation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1909, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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