This paper addresses three questions related to limits on DC contributions. The first is whether statutory limits on tax-deductible contributions to defined contribution (DC) plans are likely to be binding, focusing on households in various economic situations. The second is how large is the tax benefit from participating in defined contribution plans. The third is how does the defined contribution tax benefit depend on the level of lifetime income. We find that the statutory limits bind those older middle-income households who started their pension savings programs late in life, those who plan to retire early, single-earner households, those who are not borrowing constrained, and those with rapid rates of real wage growth. Most households with high levels of earnings, regardless of age or situation, are also constrained by the contribution limits. Lower or middle-income two-eamer households that can look forward to modest real earnings growth are likely to be borrowing constrained for most of their pre-retirement years because of the costs of paying a mortgage and sending children to college. These households are not in a position to save the 25 percent of earnings allowed as a contribution to DC plans. Some of these middle-income households, however, are constrained by the $10,500 limit on elective employee contributions to 401(k) plans if the households have access to only these plans and their employers make no pension contributions for them. The borrowing constraints faced by many lower- and middle-income Americans means that contributions to DC plans must come at the price of lower consumption when young and the benefit of higher consumption when old. Indeed, for a stylized household earning $50,000, consistently contributing 10 percent of salary to a DC plans that earns a 4 percent real return means consuming almost two times more when old than when young. Measured as a share of lifetime consumption, the tax benefit from participating in a DC plan can be significant. Assuming annual contribution rates at the average of the maximum levels allowed by employers in 401 (k) plans and assuming a 4 percent real return on DC and non-DC assets, the benefit is 2 percent for two-earner households earning $25,000 per year, 3.4 percent for those earning $100,000 per year, and 9.8 percent for those earning $300,000 per year...
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
8170.
Length: Date of creation: Mar 2001 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8170
Note: AG PE Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. Phone: 617-868-3900 Email: Web page: http://www.nber.org More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Find related papers by JEL classification: D9 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 2001.
"Who gets paid to save?,"
Working Paper
0114, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 2003.
"Who Gets Paid to Save?,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 17, pages 111-140
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]