Measuring the Effects of Arbitration on Wage Levels: The Case of Police Officers
AbstractIn this paper we provide an empirical evaluation of the effect that the provision of an arbitration statute has on the wage levels of police officers. We analyze the effect of arbitration on wages by comparing wage levels across political jurisdictions and over time using a sample of states. Two complementary data sources are used: panel data on state level wages of police officers, and individual level data on police officers from Decennial Censuses. The empirical results from both data sets are remarkably consistent and provide no robust evidence that the presence of arbitration statues has a consistent effect on overall wage levels. On average, the effect of arbitration is approximately zero, although there is substantial heterogeneity in the estimated effects across states.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7294.
Date of creation: Aug 1999
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Other versions of this item:
- Orley Ashenfelter & Dean Hyslop, 2001. "Measuring the effect of arbitration on wage levels: The case of police officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 54(2), pages 316-328, January.
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-08-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1999-08-27 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAB-1999-08-27 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-PUB-1999-08-27 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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