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A Contracting-Theory Interpretation of the Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance

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  • Edward J. Kane
  • Berry K. Wilson

Abstract

Conventional wisdom holds that the enactment of federal deposit insurance helped small rural banks at the expense of large urban institutions. This paper uses asymmetric information, agency-cost paradigms from corporate finance theory and data on bank stock prices to show how deposit insurance could and did help stockholders of large banks. The broadening stockholder distribution of large banks during the stock market bubble of the late 1920s undermined the efficiency of double liability provisions in controlling incentive conflict among large bank stakeholders. Federal deposit insurance restored depositor confidence by asking government officials to take over and bond the task of monitoring managerial performance and solvency at U.S. banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Edward J. Kane & Berry K. Wilson, 1998. "A Contracting-Theory Interpretation of the Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6451
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chesini, Giusy & Giaretta, Elisa, 2017. "Depositor discipline for better or for worse. What enhanced depositors’ confidence on the banking system in the last ten years?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 209-227.
    2. Beck, Thorsten & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Resolution of failed banks by deposit insurers : cross-country evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3920, The World Bank.
    3. Charles W. Calomiris & Berry Wilson, 2004. "Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: The 1930s "Capital Crunch" and the Scramble to Shed Risk," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(3), pages 421-456, July.
    4. Gorton, Gary & Winton, Andrew, 2003. "Financial intermediation," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 431-552, Elsevier.
    5. Nechita Radu, 2003. "Demand Deposits Insurance and Double Liability : The effect On Incentives," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-44, March.
    6. Malcolm Anderson, 1999. "Accounting History Publications 1998," Accounting History Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 375-384.
    7. Viral V. Acharya & Thomas Cooley & Matthew Richardson & Ingo Walter, 2011. "Market Failures and Regulatory Failures : Lessons from Past and Present Financial Crises," Governance Working Papers 23273, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    8. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 407-438, July.
    9. Kane, Edward J. & Wilson, Berry, 2002. "Regression evidence of safety-net support in Canada and the U.S., 1893-1992," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 649-671.
    10. John D. Wagster, 2007. "Wealth and Risk Effects of Adopting Deposit Insurance in Canada: Evidence of Risk Shifting by Banks and Trust Companies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(7), pages 1651-1681, October.
    11. Charles W. Calomiris & Elliot S.M. Oh, 2018. "Who Owned Citibank? Familiarity Bias and Business Network Influences on Stock Purchases, 1925-1929," NBER Working Papers 24431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. UEDA Kenichi, 2019. "Speedy Bankruptcy Procedures and Bank Bailouts," Discussion papers 19108, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    13. Haelim Anderson & Daniel Barth & Dong Beom Choi, 2018. "Reducing moral hazard at the expense of market discipline: the effectiveness of double liability before and during the Great Depression," Staff Reports 869, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    14. Mark Carlson, 2010. "Alternatives for Distressed Banks during the Great Depression," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2-3), pages 421-441, March.
    15. Luc Laeven, 2004. "The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 26(3), pages 201-224, December.
    16. DeLong, Gayle & Saunders, Anthony, 2011. "Did the introduction of fixed-rate federal deposit insurance increase long-term bank risk-taking?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 19-25, January.
    17. Ching-Yi Chung & Gary Richardson, 2006. "Deposit Insurance and the Composition of Bank Suspensions in Developing Economies: Lessons from the State Deposit Insurance Experiments of the 1920S," NBER Working Papers 12594, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Deposit insurance design and implementation : policy lessons from research and practice," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3969, The World Bank.

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    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions

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