Tax Burden and Migration: A Political Economy Perspective
AbstractThe extent of taxation and redistribution policy is generally determined at a political-economy equilibrium by a balance between those who gain and those who lose from a more extensive tax-transfer policy. In a stylized model of migration and human capital formation we find, somewhat against conventional wisdom, that low-skill migration may lead to a lower tax burden and less redistribution than without migration, even though the migrants (naturally) join the pro-tax cum transfer coalition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5850.
Date of creation: Dec 1996
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Other versions of this item:
- Eazim, A. & Sadka, E., 1996. "Tax Burden and Migration: A Political Economy Perspective," Papers 35-96, Tel Aviv.
- F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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