Economic Issues in Vaccine Purchase Arrangements
AbstractFederal purchases of major childhood vaccines account for roughly half of the total market for these vaccines. This paper examines Federal purchasing practices in the context of the recent literature on bidding and procurement, and compares these practices to UNICEF vaccine procurement arrangements. Federal contracts were awarded to a single winner and the firms eligible to bid were limited in number (since the number of U.S. licensed firms is small). Since production capacity cannot be expanded quickly, and the Federal share of purchases is large, it is hypothesized that firms' bid prices will be higher for larger contracts. The paper analyzes contracts over the period 1977 through 1992 to determine the contract size-price relationship, as well as effects on contract prices of 1) the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program enacted in 1987 and 2) changes in numbers of firms in the market. Results provide equivocal support for a positive size-price relationship and evidence of a positive price effect of the injury compensation program.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5248.
Date of creation: Sep 1995
Date of revision:
Note: HC HE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert G. Hansen, 1988. "Auctions with Endogenous Quantity," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 44-58, Spring.
- Pauly, Mark V., 1988. "Market power, monopsony, and health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 111-128, June.
- Sushil Bikhchandani & Chi-fu Huang, 1993. "The Economics of Treasury Securities Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 117-134, Summer.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
- Willis R. Greer, Jr. & Shu S. Liao, 1986. "An Analysis of Risk and Return in the Defense Market: Its Impact on Weapon System Competition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(10), pages 1259-1273, October.
- Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
- Riley, John G, 1989. "Expected Revenue from Open and Sealed Bid Auctions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 41-50, Summer.
- Michael Kremer, 2001.
"Creating Markets for New Vaccines - Part I: Rationale,"
in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 35-72
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Kremer, 2000. "Creating Markets for New Vaccines Part I: Rationale," NBER Working Papers 7716, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Kremer, 2000.
"Creating Markets for New Vaccines Part II: Design Issues,"
NBER Working Papers
7717, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Kremer, 2001. "Creating Markets for New Vaccines - Part II: Design Issues," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 73-118 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.