Choosing a Dictator: Bureaucracy and Welfare in Less Developed Polities
AbstractRecent work in the sociology of economic development has emphasized the establishment of a professional government bureaucracy in place of political appointees as an important component of the institutional environment in which private enterprise can flourish. I focus on the role that internal promotion can play in bringing to power individuals who highly value (relative to income) imposition of their preferences over collective goods on the public. Such individuals restrain the corruption of their subordinates as a byproduct of their efforts to implement their preferences using tax revenue. Within this hierarchical framework I investigate the effects of varying subordinate compensation levels and of recruiting them meritocratically.
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Date of creation: Jul 1995
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
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