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Insulation of Pensions from Political Risk

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  • Peter Diamond

Abstract

There are many sources of political risk to public provision of pensions. This paper analyzes legislation to alter the retirement income system. This approach naturally recognizes that some changes in the system are good responses to social risks, while others generate such risks. Thus the discussion is in terms of the effect of institutional structure on the likelihood of alternative legislative actions. Particular attention is paid to the roles of automatic pension adjustment and pension professionals in providing insulation. Briefly touched upon is the tendency of legislation to redistribute as a function of the type of system being created.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4895.

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Date of creation: Oct 1994
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Publication status: published as in S. Valdez, editer, The Economics of Pensions: Principles, Policies, and International Experience; Cambridge University Press ; Cambridge, 1997
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4895

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  1. Malinvaud, E., 1972. "The allocation of individual risks in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 312-328, April.
  2. William D. Nordhaus, 1989. "Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(2), pages 1-68.
  3. Robert C. Merton, 1983. "On Consumption Indexed Public Pension Plans," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Financial Aspects of the United States Pension System, pages 259-290 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Schelling, Thomas C, 1984. "Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 1-11, May.
  5. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Salvador Valdés & Peter Diamond, . "Social Security Reforms in Chile," Documentos de Trabajo, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. 161, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  7. John Geanakoplos & Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii & J. Dreze, 1988. "Generic Inefficiency of Stock Market Equilibrium When Markets Are Incomplete," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 863, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  9. Stokey, Nancy L, 1989. "Reputation and Time Consistency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 134-39, May.
  10. Solow, Robert M, 1980. "On Theories of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 70(1), pages 1-11, March.
  11. Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, 1992. "On the Management of Financial Guarantees," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, Financial Management Association, vol. 21(4), Winter.
  12. Zvi Bodie & John B. Shoven & David A. Wise, 1988. "Pensions in the U.S. Economy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bodi88-1.
  13. Peter Diamond, 2004. "Social Security," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 1-24, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Alessandro Bucciol, 2006. "The Roles of Temptation and Social Security in Explaining Individual Behavior," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno" 0032, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  2. Ayse Imrohoroglu & Selahattin Imrohoroglu & Douglas H. Joines, 2000. "Time inconsistent preferences and Social Security," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 136, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

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