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Should the Government's Allocation Branch be Concerned about the Distortionary Cost of Taxation and Distributive Effects?

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Louis Kaplow

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Abstract

Does taxation for public goods generally involve a distortionary cost? Are Pigouvian taxes desirable because they raise revenue without having to resort to distortionary taxes? Should decisions concerning public goods or Pigouvian taxes depend on whether their incidence is regressive? The answer to these questions may be negative, contrary to conventional wisdom, if one considers a different and arguably more natural method of achieving budget balance than is typically assumed.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4566.

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Date of creation: Feb 1997
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4566

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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  15. Louis Kaplow, 1989. "Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle," NBER Working Papers 1679, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Ahmed, S. & Croushore, D., 1992. "The Marginal Cost of Funds with Nonseparable Public Spending," Papers 9-92-7, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
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  18. Christiansen, Vidar, 1981. "Evaluation of Public Projects under Optimal Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(3), pages 447-57, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Auerbach, Alan J., 1985. "The theory of excess burden and optimal taxation," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-127 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Dreze, Jean & Stern, Nicholas, 1987. "The theory of cost-benefit analysis," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 14, pages 909-989 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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