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Fiscal Federalism in Europe: Lessons From the United States Experience

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  • Robert P. Inman
  • Daniel L. Rubinfeld
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    Abstract

    The existing political and legal institutions of fiscal policy-making are under challenge. As the United States and the eastern European and Soviet states experiment with policy decentralization, the states of western Europe are looking to a more centralized policy structure via the E.E.C.. This paper seeks to raise issues of importance to all such reform efforts--notably, the need to consider, and balance, the inefficiencies of fiscal policy decentralization (spillovers and wasteful fiscal competition) against the inefficiencies of fiscal policy centralization (policy cycles and localized 'pork barrel' spending and taxes). The need to develop new fiscal policy institutions emphasizing voluntary agreements and responsive 'agenda-setters' is stressed.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3941.

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    Date of creation: Dec 1991
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    Publication status: published as European Economic Review, Vol. 36, 1992, 654-660.
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3941

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    1. Nouriel Roubini & Jeffrey Sachs, 1988. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the IndustrialDemocracies," NBER Working Papers 2682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bernard, Andrew B & Durlauf, Steven N, 1995. "Convergence in International Output," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(2), pages 97-108, April-Jun.
    3. Robin W. Boadway & Frank R. Flatters, 1982. "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(4), pages 613-33, November.
    4. Sandler, Todd & Murdoch, James C, 1990. "Nash-Cournot or Lindahl Behavior? An Empirical Test for the NATO Allies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 875-94, November.
    5. Hart, Oliver, 1982. "A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 97(1), pages 109-38, February.
    6. Kolstad, Charles D & Wolak, Frank A, Jr, 1983. "Competition in Interregional Taxation: The Case of Western Coal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 443-60, June.
    7. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
    8. Inman, Robert P & Fitts, Michael A, 1990. "Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 79-132.
    9. Scott J. Brown & N. Edward Coulson & Robert F. Engle, 1990. "Non-Cointegration and Econometric Evaluation of Models of Regional Shift and Share," NBER Working Papers 3291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:
    1. M. Mar㈠& M. Sarcinelli, 1994. "The European Union: how to assign the functions of government," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 47(191), pages 341-377.
    2. Mihai Ioan Mutascu & Bogdan Dima, 2005. "Politics And Interjurisdictional Transfers: The Romanian Case," Urban/Regional, EconWPA 0512009, EconWPA.
    3. Shah, Anwar, 2005. "Fiscal decentralization and fiscal performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3786, The World Bank.
    4. M. Mar㈠& M. Sarcinelli, 1994. "The European Union: how to assign the functions of government," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 47(191), pages 341-377.
    5. Mutaşcu, Mihai Ioan & Crasneac, Alexandru Ocatavian & Dănuleţiu, Dan-Constantin, 2007. "The Taxes Impact On The Economic Growth: The Case Of European Union," MPRA Paper 6143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Mihai, Mutascu, 2008. "The Vote, The Politics and the interjurisdictional Transfers: The Romanian Case," MPRA Paper 12048, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Anwar Shah, 2006. "Fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic management," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 437-462, August.

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