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Corporate Financial Policy, Taxation, and Macroeconomic Risk

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  • Mark Gertler
  • R. Glenn Hubbard

Abstract

This paper develops a simple model of corporate financial structure intended to formalize the macroeconomic concern over excessive leverage. In particular, we attempt to rationalize why firms designing an optimal capital structure would choose a level of debt that leaves them heavily exposed to macroeconomic risk. Our starting point is a variant of the "corporate control" model often used to motivate debt as the optimal financial contract. We modify this framework in two ways. First, we include common risks, interpretable as business cycle risks, as well as idiosyncratic risks. Second, we include corporate and investor-level taxes, and consider the implications of a net tax bias against equity finance. The tax distortion confronts firms with a tradeoff ex ante between the costs of equity finance and the costs of increased exposure to macroeconomic risk accompanying debt finance. In this regard, an equilibrium with "excessive leverage" is possible. Further, despite the possibility of renegotiation, debt is in general less effective than equity in insulating the firm against aggregate risk. Our model leads to the prediction that individual firm dividends may vary with macroeconomic conditions, even after controlling for the effects of relevant firm-specific performance measures, such as earnings. We present some formal econometric evidence in support of this prediction, using a panel of individual corporations. Evidence on some related predictions is also presented.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3902.

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Date of creation: Nov 1991
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3902

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  1. Mark J. Warshawsky, 1991. "Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis? Another Look," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets and Financial Crises, pages 207-230 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. " Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-51, September.
  3. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1991. " The Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 297-355, March.
  4. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 77-85.
  5. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "Asset Sales and Debt Capacity," NBER Working Papers 3618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Terry A. Marsh and Robert C. Merton., 1986. "Dividend Behavior for the Aggregate Stock Market," Research Program in Finance Working Papers 163, University of California at Berkeley.
  7. Mark L. Gertler & R. Glenn Hubbard, 1990. "Taxation, Corporate Capital Structure, and Financial Distress," NBER Working Papers 3202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Richard Cantor, 1990. "A panel study of the effects of leverage on investment and employment," Research Paper 9011, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  9. James M. Poterba, 1987. "Tax Policy and Corporate Saving," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(2), pages 455-516.
  10. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
  11. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-59, September.
  12. repec:fth:harver:1489 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Sudipto Bhattacharya, 1979. "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 259-270, Spring.
  14. Ben S. Bernanke & John Y. Campbell, 1988. "Is There a Corporate Debt Crisis?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 83-140.
  15. Benjamin M. Friedman, 1986. "Increasing indebtedness and financial stability in the United States," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 27-61.
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Cited by:
  1. Matteo Iacoviello, 2002. "House prices, borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business cycle," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 542, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Dec 2004.
  2. Mintz, Jack & Smart, Michael, 2002. "Tax-exempt investors and the asset allocation puzzle," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 195-215, February.
  3. Mathias Hoffmann, 2005. "Proprietary Income, Entrepreneurial Risk and the Predictability of U.S. Stock Returns," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 229, Society for Computational Economics.
  4. Gertler, M. & Rose, A., 1991. "Finance, growth, and public policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 814, The World Bank.
  5. Ignacio Fonseca, 1997. "¿Actúan los dividendos como señal?: un contraste basado en los cambios de la fiscalidad en España (1985-1995)," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 21(1), pages 93-109, January.
  6. Jean Helwege & Christo Pirinsky & René M. Stulz, 2005. "Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the ynamics of Corporate Ownership," NBER Working Papers 11505, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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