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School Performance, Accountability and Waiver Reforms: Evidence from Louisiana

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  • Thomas Dee
  • Elise Dizon-Ross

Abstract

States that received federal waivers to the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act were required to implement reforms in designated "Focus Schools" that contribute to achievement gaps. In this study, we examine the performance effects of such "differentiated accountability" reforms in the state of Louisiana. The Focus School reforms in Louisiana emphasized school-needs assessments and aligned technical assistance. These state reforms may have also been uniquely high-powered because they were linked to a new letter-based school-rating system. We examine the impact of these reforms in a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) design based on the assignment of schools to Focus status. We find that, over each of three years, Louisiana's Focus School reforms had no measurable impact on school performance. We discuss evidence that these findings may reflect policy uncertainty and implementation fidelity at the state and local level.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Dee & Elise Dizon-Ross, 2017. "School Performance, Accountability and Waiver Reforms: Evidence from Louisiana," NBER Working Papers 23463, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23463
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    1. Rajashri Chakrabarti, 2013. "Vouchers, Public School Response, And The Role Of Incentives: Evidence From Florida," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 500-526, January.
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    3. Thomas S. Dee & Brian Jacob, 2011. "The impact of no Child Left Behind on student achievement," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(3), pages 418-446, June.
    4. Sade Bonilla & Thomas S. Dee, 2020. "The Effects of School Reform under NCLB Waivers: Evidence from Focus Schools in Kentucky," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 15(1), pages 75-103, Winter.
    5. Thomas Dee, 2012. "School Turnarounds: Evidence from the 2009 Stimulus," NBER Working Papers 17990, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Hanley Chiang, "undated". "How Accountability Pressure on Failing Schools Affects Student Achievement," Mathematica Policy Research Reports c58a3b537e324447b94a2bd41, Mathematica Policy Research.
    7. repec:mpr:mprres:6364 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Chiang, Hanley, 2009. "How accountability pressure on failing schools affects student achievement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1045-1057, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sade Bonilla & Thomas S. Dee, 2020. "The Effects of School Reform under NCLB Waivers: Evidence from Focus Schools in Kentucky," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 15(1), pages 75-103, Winter.
    2. Steven W. Hemelt & Brian Jacob, 2017. "Differentiated Accountability and Education Production: Evidence from NCLB Waivers," NBER Working Papers 23461, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Steven W. Hemelt & Brian A. Jacob, 2020. "How Does an Accountability Program that Targets Achievement Gaps Affect Student Performance?," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 15(1), pages 45-74, Winter.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

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