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The Anatomy of Physician Payments: Contracting Subject to Complexity

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  • Jeffrey Clemens
  • Joshua D. Gottlieb
  • Tímea Laura Molnár

Abstract

Why do private insurers closely link their physician payment rates to the Medicare fee schedule despite its well-known limitations? We ask to what extent this relationship reflects the use of Medicare's relative price menu as a benchmark, in order to reduce transaction costs in a complex pricing environment. We analyze 91 million claims from a large private insurer, which represent $7.8 billion in spending over four years. We estimate that 75 percent of services, accounting for 55 percent of spending, are benchmarked to Medicare's relative prices. The Medicare-benchmarked share is higher for services provided by small physician groups. It is lower for capital-intensive treatment categories, for which Medicare's average-cost reimbursements deviate most from marginal cost. When the insurer deviates from Medicare's relative prices, it adjusts towards the marginal costs of treatment. Our results suggest that providers and private insurers coordinate around Medicare's menu of relative payments for simplicity, but innovate when the value of doing so is likely highest.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb & Tímea Laura Molnár, 2015. "The Anatomy of Physician Payments: Contracting Subject to Complexity," NBER Working Papers 21642, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21642
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Laurence Baker & M. Kate Bundorf & Aileen Devlin & Daniel P. Kessler, 2016. "Why Don’t Commercial Health Plans Use Prospective Payment?," NBER Working Papers 22709, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Maria Polyakova, 2018. "Private Provision of Social Insurance: Drug-Specific Price Elasticities and Cost Sharing in Medicare Part D," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 122-153, August.
    3. Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb & Adam Hale Shapiro, 2016. "Medicare payment cuts continue to restrain inflation," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    4. Michael Batty & Benedic Ippolito, 2017. "Financial Incentives, Hospital Care, and Health Outcomes: Evidence from Fair Pricing Laws," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 28-56, May.
    5. Steve Cicala & Ethan M. J. Lieber & Victoria Marone, 2019. "Regulating Markups in US Health Insurance," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 71-104, October.
    6. Benedic N. Ippolito, 2016. "Financial incentives, hospital care, and health outcomes: Evidence from fair pricing laws," AEI Economics Working Papers 863745, American Enterprise Institute.
    7. Michael L. Barnett & Andrew Olenski & Adam Sacarny, 2023. "Common Practice: Spillovers from Medicare on Private Health Care," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 65-88, August.
    8. Jeffrey Clemens & Benedic Ippolito, 2019. "Uncompensated Care and the Collapse of Hospital Payment Regulation: An Illustration of the Tinbergen Rule," Public Finance Review, , vol. 47(6), pages 1002-1041, November.
    9. Zack Cooper & Fiona Scott Morton & Nathan Shekita, 2020. "Surprise! Out-of-Network Billing for Emergency Care in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(9), pages 3626-3677.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

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