Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service
AbstractIn this paper, we demonstrate that university students who cheat on a simple task in a laboratory setting are more likely to state a preference for entering public service. Importantly, we also show that cheating on this task is predictive of corrupt behavior by real government workers, implying that this measure captures a meaningful propensity towards corruption. Students who demonstrate lower levels of prosocial preferences in the laboratory games are also more likely to prefer to enter the government, while outcomes on explicit, two-player games to measure cheating and attitudinal measures of corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. We find that a screening process that chooses the highest ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption among the applicant pool. Our findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption. They also emphasize that screening characteristics other than ability may be useful in reducing corruption, but caution that more explicit measures may offer little predictive power.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19649.
Date of creation: Nov 2013
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
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- NEP-ALL-2013-11-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2013-11-22 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2013-11-22 (Experimental Economics)
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- Tonin, Mirco & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2014. "Are Public Sector Workers Different? Cross-European Evidence from Elderly Workers and Retirees," IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 8238, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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