IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/19257.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Regulatory reform and risk-taking: replacing ratings

Author

Listed:
  • Bo Becker
  • Marcus Opp

Abstract

We analyze a reform of insurance companies' capital requirements for mortgage-backed securities. First, credit ratings were replaced as inputs to capital regulation. Second, the redesigned system ensures capital buffers sufficient to withstand expected losses, but insufficient to protect against adverse outcomes. Many bonds are now treated as riskless and require minimal capital. By 2012, aggregate capital requirements for mortgage-backed securities have been reduced from $19.36bn (had the previous system been maintained) to $3.73bn. Exploiting that the change did not affect other asset classes, we document that insurers' risk taking was distorted and increased in response to the new regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Bo Becker & Marcus Opp, 2013. "Regulatory reform and risk-taking: replacing ratings," NBER Working Papers 19257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19257
    Note: CF
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w19257.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ralph S. J. Koijen & Motohiro Yogo, 2015. "The Cost of Financial Frictions for Life Insurers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(1), pages 445-475, January.
    2. Skreta, Vasiliki & Veldkamp, Laura, 2009. "Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 678-695, July.
    3. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2012. "The Credit Ratings Game," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 85-112, February.
    4. Ellul, Andrew & Jotikasthira, Chotibhak & Lundblad, Christian T., 2011. "Regulatory pressure and fire sales in the corporate bond market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 596-620, September.
    5. Mathis, Jérôme & McAndrews, James & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2009. "Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 657-674, July.
    6. John M. Griffin & Jordan Nickerson & Dragon Yongjun Tang, 2013. "Rating Shopping or Catering? An Examination of the Response to Competitive Pressure for CDO Credit Ratings," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(9), pages 2270-2310.
    7. Becker, Bo & Milbourn, Todd, 2011. "How did increased competition affect credit ratings?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 493-514, September.
    8. Merrill, Craig B. & Nadauld, Taylor & Sherlund, Shane M., 2013. "Why Did Financial Institutions Sell RMBS at Fire Sale Prices during the Financial Crisis?," Working Paper Series 2013-02, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
    9. Opp, Christian C. & Opp, Marcus M. & Harris, Milton, 2013. "Rating agencies in the face of regulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 46-61.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Opp, Marcus & Harris, Milton & Opp, Christian, 2020. "The aggregate demand for bank capital," CEPR Discussion Papers 14524, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Joseph Briggs & Christopher Tonetti, 2019. "Risky Insurance: Insurance Portfolio Choice with Incomplete Markets," 2019 Meeting Papers 1388, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Bo Becker & Marcus M Opp & Farzad Saidi, 2022. "Regulatory Forbearance in the U.S. Insurance Industry: The Effects of Removing Capital Requirements for an Asset Class," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(12), pages 5438-5482.
    4. Michelle L. Barnes, 2016. "Did life insurers benefit from TARP or regulatory forbearance during the financial crisis of 2008–2009?," Working Papers 16-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    5. Abbassi, Puriya & Iyer, Rajkamal & Peydró, José-Luis & Soto, Paul, 2020. "Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review," EconStor Preprints 217048, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    6. David Glancy & John R. Krainer & Robert J. Kurtzman & Joseph B. Nichols, 2022. "Intermediary Segmentation in the Commercial Real Estate Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(7), pages 2029-2080, October.
    7. Becker, Bo & Opp, Marcus & Saidi, Farzad, 2020. "Regulatory Forbearance in the U.S. Insurance Industry: The Effects of Eliminating Capital Requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers 14373, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Goel, Anand M. & Thakor, Anjan V., 2015. "Information reliability and welfare: A theory of coarse credit ratings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 541-557.
    9. Ralph S.J. Koijen & Motohiro Yogo, 2017. "Risk of Life Insurers: Recent Trends and Transmission Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 23365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Hu, Xiaolu & Huang, Haozhi & Pan, Zheyao & Shi, Jing, 2019. "Information asymmetry and credit rating: A quasi-natural experiment from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 132-152.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Xia, Han, 2014. "Can investor-paid credit rating agencies improve the information quality of issuer-paid rating agencies?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 450-468.
    2. Cornaggia, Jess & Cornaggia, Kimberly J. & Xia, Han, 2016. "Revolving doors on Wall Street," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 400-419.
    3. Jess N. Cornaggia & Kimberly J. Cornaggia & John E. Hund, 2017. "Credit Ratings Across Asset Classes: A Long-Term Perspective," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(2), pages 465-509.
    4. Valentina Bruno & Jess Cornaggia & Kimberly J. Cornaggia, 2016. "Does Regulatory Certification Affect the Information Content of Credit Ratings?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(6), pages 1578-1597, June.
    5. Lugo, Stefano, 2014. "Discretionary ratings and the pricing of subprime mortgage-backed securities," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 248-260.
    6. Jess N. Cornaggia & Kimberly J. Cornaggia & Ryan D. Israelsen, 2020. "Where the Heart Is: Information Production and the Home Bias," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(12), pages 5532-5557, December.
    7. Farkas, Miklós, 2021. "Competition, communication and rating bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 637-656.
    8. Gredil, Oleg R. & Kapadia, Nishad & Lee, Jung Hoon, 2022. "On the information content of credit ratings and market-based measures of default risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 172-204.
    9. Francesco Sangiorgi & Chester Spatt, 2017. "Opacity, Credit Rating Shopping, and Bias," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(12), pages 4016-4036, December.
    10. Bongaerts, Dion, 2014. "Alternatives for issuer-paid credit rating agencies," Working Paper Series 1703, European Central Bank.
    11. Brendan Daley & Brett Green & Victoria Vanasco, 2020. "Securitization, Ratings, and Credit Supply," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(2), pages 1037-1082, April.
    12. Chen, Zhongfei & Matousek, Roman & Stewart, Chris & Webb, Rob, 2019. "Do rating agencies exhibit herding behaviour? Evidence from sovereign ratings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 57-70.
    13. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2017. "The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst Incentives," Working Papers 258, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    14. Becker, Bo & Opp, Marcus & Saidi, Farzad, 2020. "Regulatory Forbearance in the U.S. Insurance Industry: The Effects of Eliminating Capital Requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers 14373, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Efing, Matthias & Hau, Harald, 2015. "Structured debt ratings: Evidence on conflicts of interest," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 46-60.
    16. Anna Bayona & Oana Peia & Razvan Vlahu, 2023. "Credit Ratings and Investments," Working Papers 776, DNB.
    17. Javed I. Ahmed, 2014. "Competition in Lending and Credit Ratings," Working Papers 14-01, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    18. Mathias Kronlund, 2020. "Do Bond Issuers Shop for Favorable Credit Ratings?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(12), pages 5944-5968, December.
    19. Matthieu Bouvard & Raphaël Levy, 2018. "Two-Sided Reputation in Certification Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4755-4774, October.
    20. Hirth, Stefan, 2014. "Credit rating dynamics and competition," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 100-112.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19257. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.