Using Performance Incentives to Improve Medical Care Productivity and Health Outcomes
AbstractWe nested a large-scale field experiment into the national rollout of the introduction of performance pay for medical care providers in Rwanda to study the effect of incentives for health care providers. In order to identify the effect of incentives separately from higher compensation, we held constant compensation across treatment and comparison groups – a portion of the treatment group’s compensation was based on performance whereas the compensation of the comparison group was fixed. The incentives led to a 20% increase in productivity, and significant improvements in child health. We also find evidence of a strong complementarity between performance incentives and baseline provider skill.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19046.
Date of creation: May 2013
Date of revision:
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- Gertler, Paul & Vermeerch, Christel, 2013. "Using Performance Incentives to Improve Medical Care Productivity and Health Outcomes," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley qt9qn9q7ph, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2013-05-24 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HEA-2013-05-24 (Health Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2013-05-24 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
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