Incentivizing China’s Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities: The Role of the Central Government and Public Environmentalism
AbstractChina’s extremely high levels of urban air, water and greenhouse gas emissions levels pose local and global environmental challenges. China’s urban leaders have substantial influence and discretion over the evolution of economic activity that generates such externalities. This paper examines the political economy of urban leaders’ incentives to tackle pollution issues. Based on a principal-agent framework, we present evidence consistent with the hypothesis that both the central government and the public are placing pressure on China’s urban leaders to mitigate externalities. Such “pro-green” incentives suggest that many of China’s cities could enjoy significant environmental progress in the near future.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18872.
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Note: EEE PE POL
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
- R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2013-03-16 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-03-16 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-RES-2013-03-16 (Resource Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2013-03-16 (Transition Economics)
- NEP-URE-2013-03-16 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- My Harvard Business Review Blog Piece on China's Bullet Trains and a History of My Economic Thought About China
by Matthew Kahn in Environmental and Urban Economics on 2013-04-08 15:50:00
- Exploring Green Cities in China
by Matthew Kahn in Urbanization Project on 2013-04-09 23:17:09
- My Recent Political Economy Work
by Matthew Kahn in Environmental and Urban Economics on 2013-05-08 00:54:00
- Matthew E. Kahn & Pei Li & Daxuan Zhao, 2013. "Pollution Control Effort at China’s River Borders: When Does Free Riding Cease?," NBER Working Papers 19620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Siqi Zheng & Cong Sun & Ye Qi & Matthew E. Kahn, 2013. "The Evolving Geography of China’s Industrial Production: Implications for Pollution Dynamics and Urban Quality of Life," NBER Working Papers 19624, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.