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Matthew: Effect or Fable?

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  • Pierre Azoulay
  • Toby Stuart
  • Yanbo Wang

Abstract

In a market context, a status effect occurs when actors are accorded differential recognition for their efforts depending on their location in a status ordering, holding constant the quality of these efforts. In practice, because it is very difficult to measure quality, this ceteris paribus proviso often precludes convincing empirical assessments of the magnitude of status effects. We address this problem by examining the impact of a major status-conferring prize that shifts actors' positions in a prestige ordering. Specifically, using a precisely constructed matched sample, we estimate the effect of a scientist becoming a Howard Hughes Medical Investigator (HHMI) on citations to articles the scientist published before the prize was awarded. We do find evidence of a post-appointment citation boost, but the effect is small and limited to a short window of time. Consistent with theories of status, however, the effect of the prize is significantly larger when there is uncertainty about article quality, and when prize-winners are of (relatively) low status at the time of election to HHMI.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Azoulay & Toby Stuart & Yanbo Wang, 2012. "Matthew: Effect or Fable?," NBER Working Papers 18625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18625
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18625.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Javier Ruiz-Castillo, 2013. "The role of statistics in establishing the similarity of citation distributions in a static and a dynamic context," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 96(1), pages 173-181, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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