Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement
AbstractThis continent compares two alternative systems of private antitrust enforcement. In one (referred to as the "damage multiplier approach"), the plaintiff receives what the defendant pays; in the other (the"decoupling approach"), this constraint is not imposed. Reducing treble damages to single damages("detrebling") would be an example of the first approach. Making the defendant pay treble damages while only giving the plaintiff single damages would be an example of the second approach. It is shown, using the principles of the the economic theory of enforcement, that the decoupling approach is preferable to the damage multiplier approach, and that the optimal system of decoupling could award the plaintiff more or less than what the defendant pays. Several additional issues are raised that need to be considered before decoupling can be recommended in practice.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 1846.
Date of creation: Feb 1986
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Polinsky, A. Mitchell. "Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement," Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 74, No. 4, (April 1986), pp. 1231-1236.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
- William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "The Private Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 0062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Easterbrook, Frank H, 1985. "Detrebling Antitrust Damages," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 445-67, May.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1979. "Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines," NBER Working Papers 0338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Lawrence White, 2001.
"Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer,
Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 23-31, February.
- Lawrence J. White, 1999. "Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 99-02, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.