New Tools for the Analysis of Political Power in Africa
AbstractThe study of autocracies and weakly institutionalized countries is plagued by scarcity of information about the relative strength of different players within the political system. This paper presents novel data on the composition of government coalitions in a sample of fifteen post-colonial African countries suited to this task. We emphasize the role of the executive branch as the central fulcrum of all national political systems in our sample, especially relative to other institutional bodies such as the legislative assembly. Leveraging on the impressive body of work documenting the crucial role of ethnic fragmentation as a main driver of political and social friction in Africa, the paper further details the construction of ethnic composition measures for executive cabinets. We discuss how this novel source of information may help shed light on the inner workings of typically opaque African political elites.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18424.
Date of creation: Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming: New Tools for the Analysis of Political Power in Africa , Ilia Rainer, Francesco Trebbi. in African Successes: Government and Institutions , Edwards, Johnson, and Weil. 2014
Note: POL DEV
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Other versions of this item:
- Ilia Rainer & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "New Tools for the Analysis of Political Power in Africa," NBER Chapters, in: African Successes: Government and Institutions National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
- O55 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2012-10-06 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-10-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DEV-2012-10-06 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2012-10-06 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.
- Dimico, Arcangelo, 2014.
"Size Matters: The Effect of the Scramble for Africa on Informal Institutions and Development,"
QUCEH Working Paper Series
14-02, Queen's University Centre for Economic History, Queen's University Belfast.
- Dimico, Arcangelo, 2013. "Size Matters: The Effect of the Scramble for Africa on Informal Institutions and Development," MPRA Paper 54550, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Mar 2014.
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