International Liquidity: The Fiscal Dimension
AbstractThis paper argues that if policymakers seek to enhance global liquidity, then the international community must provide a higher and better coordinated level of fiscal support than it has in the past. Loans to troubled sovereigns or financial institutions imply a credit risk that ultimately must be lodged somewhere. Expanded international lending facilities, including an expanded IMF, cannot remain unconditionally solvent absent an expanded level of fiscal backup. The same point obviously applies to the European framework for managing internal sovereign debt problems, including proposals for a jointly guaranteed eurozone sovereign bond. Even attainment of a significant role for the Special Drawing Right depends upon enhanced fiscal resources and burden sharing at the international level.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17379.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Note: IFM ME
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2011-09-16 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2011-09-16 (Central Banking)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, 2003.
NBER Working Papers
9908, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aaron Brown, 2011. "Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System, by Barry Eichengreen," Quantitative Finance, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(6), pages 825-826.
- Edwin M. Truman, 2008. "On What Terms Is the IMF Worth Funding?," Working Paper Series WP08-11, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 2012.
"Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar,"
Oxford University Press, number 9780199642472.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 2011. "Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199596713.
- Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update," CEPS Papers 7276, Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Jeanne, Olivier, 2012.
"The Dollar and its Discontents,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
9007, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 2012. "Implications of the Euro's crisis for international monetary reform," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 541-548.
- Schoenmaker, Dirk & Gros, Daniel, 2012. "A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund," CEPS Papers 6918, Centre for European Policy Studies.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.