Do Majority Black Districts Limit Blacks’ Representation? The Case of the 1990 Redistricting
AbstractConventional wisdom and empirical academic research conclude that majority Black districts decrease Black representation by increasing conservatism in Congress. However, this research generally suffers from three limitations: 1) too low a level of aggregation 2) lack of a counterfactual and 3) failure to account for the endogeneity of the creation of majority minority districts. I compare congressional delegations of states that during the 1990 redistricting were under greater pressure to create majority minority districts with those under lesser pressure in a difference-in-difference framework. I find no evidence that the creation of majority minority districts leads to more conservative House delegations. In fact point estimates indicate that states that increased their share of majority Black districts saw their delegations grow increasingly liberal. I find similar results for majority Latino districts in the southwest. Thus I find no evidence for the common view that majority minority districts decrease minority representation in Congress.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17099.
Date of creation: May 2011
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Publication status: published as “Do Majority Black Districts Lim it Blacks’ Representation? The Case of the 1990 Redistricting” Journal of Law and Economics , 2012, 55 (2) 251-274.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-06-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2011-06-04 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2011-06-04 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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- Keisuke Nakao, 2011. "Racial Redistricting For Minority Representation Without Partisan Bias: A Theoretical Approach," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 132-151, 03.
- Kan, Kamhon & Yang, C C, 2001. " On Expressive Voting: Evidence from the 1988 U.S. Presidential Election," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 108(3-4), pages 295-312, September.
- John N. Friedman & Richard T. Holden, 2008. "Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 113-44, March.
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