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Optimal Policy Instruments for Externality-Producing Durable Goods Under Time Inconsistency

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  • Garth Heutel

Abstract

When consumers exhibit present bias and are time-inconsistent, the standard solution to market failures caused by externalities—Pigouvian pricing—is suboptimal. I investigate policies aimed at externalities for time-inconsistent consumers. Welfare-maximizing policy in this case includes an instrument to correct the externality and an instrument to correct the present bias. Either instrument can be an incentive-based policy or a command-and-control policy. Calibrated to the US automobile market, simulation results from a model with time-inconsistent consumers suggest that the second-best gasoline tax is 18%–30% higher than marginal external damages. These simulations also suggest that social welfare is maximized with a gasoline tax set about equal to marginal external damages and a fuel economy tax that increases the price of an average non-hybrid car by about $750–$2200 relative to the price of an average hybrid car.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17083.

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Date of creation: May 2011
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17083

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  1. Espey, Molly, 1998. "Gasoline demand revisited: an international meta-analysis of elasticities," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 273-295, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Tsvetan Tsvetanov & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Re-Evaluating the Role of Energy Efficiency Standards: A Time-Consistent Behavioral Economics Approach," Working papers 2011-24, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  2. Dieckhoener, Caroline, 2012. "Does subsidizing investments in energy efficiency reduce energy consumption? Evidence from Germany," EWI Working Papers 2012-17, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln.
  3. Hunt Allcott & Michael Greenstone, 2012. "Is There an Energy Efficiency Gap?," NBER Working Papers 17766, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. repec:zwi:wpaper:07 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Courtemanche, Charles & McAlvanah, Patrick & Heutel, Garth, 2011. "Impatience, Incentives, and Obesity," Working Papers 11-9, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics, revised 28 Sep 2011.

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