Property Rights and Financial Development: The Legacy of Japanese Colonial Institutions
AbstractSeveral studies link modern economic performance to institutions transplanted by European colonizers and here we extend this line of research to Asia. Japan imposed its system of well-defined property rights in land on some of its Asian colonies, including Korea, Taiwan and Palau. In 1939 Japan began to survey and register private land in its island colonies, an effort that was completed in Palau but interrupted elsewhere by World War II. Within Micronesia robust economic development followed only in Palau where individual property rights were well defined. Second, we show that well-defined property rights in Korea and Taiwan secured land taxation and enabled farmers to obtain bank loans for capital improvements, principally irrigation systems. Our analytical model predicts that high costs of creating an ownership updating system and a citizen identity system discourage a short-sighted government from implementing these crucial components, the absence of which gradually makes land registration obsolete. Third, considering all of Japan’s colonies, we use the presence or absence of a land survey as an instrument to identify the causal impact of new institutions. Our estimates show that property-defining institutions were important for economic development, results that are confirmed when using a similar approach with British Colonies in Asia.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 16551.
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Note: DAE LE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Galiani, Sebastian & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2010.
"Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 700-729, October.
- Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2010. "Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling," CEDLAS, Working Papers 0103, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
- Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2005. "Property Rights for the Poor: Effects of Land Titling," Business School Working Papers proprightspoor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Nunn, Nathan, 2007.
"The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades,"
4134, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Akramov, Kamiljon T. & Omuraliev, Nurbek, 2009. "Institutional change, rural services, and agricultural performance in Kyrgyzstan:," IFPRI discussion papers 904, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Sumner J. La Croix & James Mak & Louis A. Rose, 1993.
"The Political Economy of Urban Land Reform in Hawaii,"
199313-R, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Sumner J. La Croix & James Mak & Louis A. Rose, 1995. "The Political Economy of Urban Land Reform in Hawaii," Working Papers 199506, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Quy-Toan Do & Lakshmi Iyer, 2008. "Land Titling and Rural Transition in Vietnam," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56, pages 531-579.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2010.
"History Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India,"
- Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1190-1213, September.
- Stock, James H & Wright, Jonathan H & Yogo, Motohiro, 2002. "A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 20(4), pages 518-29, October.
- Niclas Berggren & Christian Bjørnskov, 2012.
"Does Religiosity Promote Property Rights and the Rule of Law?,"
ICER Working Papers
02-2012, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Berggren, Niclas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2013. "Does religiosity promote property rights and the rule of law?," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(02), pages 161-185, June.
- Berggren, Niclas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2012. "Does Religiosity Promote Property Rights and the Rule of Law?," Working Paper Series 905, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Niclas Berggren & Christian Bjørnskov, 2012. "Does Religiosity Promote Property Rights and the Rule of Law?," Economics Working Papers 2012-08, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
- Cha, Myung Soo & Kim, Nak Nyeon, 2012. "Korea's first industrial revolution, 1911–1940," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 60-74.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.